Ireland and the Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity, 14 December 1973

Description

Irish scholarship has neglected the Copenhagen ‘Declaration on the European Identity’ (hereafter CDEI). This reflects the limited public commentary beyond factual newspaper reports summarising or quoting the declaration verbatim in December 1973. Likewise, discussions in the national parliament’s upper and lower houses and oral reports by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Garret Fitzgerald, to both houses make insubstantial or no mention of the declaration.

Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) files indicate that the primary stimulus lay in broader European-US relations, specifically the Nixon/Kissinger initiative of ‘The Year of Europe’ after April 1973. This fuelled discussions about the Nine’s response within the Davignon/EPC. European reactions were mixed at best. The Irish viewed Kissinger’s linking of economics, defence and diplomacy as conflating different domains, particularly those of the EC and NATO. Irish and EC documents show that the American jolt complemented EC pressures espoused in the Paris Summit’s (December 1972) ‘solemn declaration’ that it should transform into a European Union by 1980. Pompidou pressed for advances in EC deepening.

The orthodoxy argues that official Irish discourse successfully constructed Irish nationalism and European integration in a complementary fashion in the 1960s and 1970s. The landslide Irish accession referendum on 10 May 1972 appeared to underline that, and the Irish electorate accepted accession as ‘a reassertion of independence’, not a constricting factor. Attention was focused on economic opportunity (Irish GDP was 50% of the EC average); ‘ever closer union’ was not a matter of deep Irish debate, as the EC was in an infant political phase. However, the forces impelling the EC to speak cohesively forced the pace.

Ireland transitioned to a new government, a Fine Gael and Labour coalition. It entered office in March 1973 after 17 years of government by Fianna Fáil. Taoiseach Jack Lynch had called, and unexpectedly narrowly lost, a surprise general election in February after entry into the ‘promised land’ (aka the EEC). By 1973, Lynch had negotiated Irish entry to the EC, a popular national aim. He had instituted a stable line on the Northern Ireland Troubles and had a tight grip on rebellious party elements. After 1969, Irish-British practice kept the Troubles out of multilateral and EC fora, treating it as a strictly bilateral issue to be resolved peacefully and by consent.

In the late spring and early summer, the thinking of the new Irish government had not evolved far on EC-US relations or the European identity question. According to Irish accounts, French opposition held up discussions in the EPC during the summer on a response to the ‘Year of Europe’ initiative. Irish authorities believed a ‘New Atlantic Charter’ was premature and forced the pace to manufacture one European voice from a complex institutional framework involving multiple organisations with diverse competencies and different memberships. Garret Fitzgerald assumed it would be a mistake to define the US-European relationship too legalistically or precisely.

The Irish appreciated that enlargement gave the EC a more ‘outward-looking’ aspect as the ‘new Nine were being increasingly influenced in the direction of examining the political over-tones of the economic policies of the Communities.’ It was vigilant about any mention of defence or NATO in EC-US discussions or any formulation of EC identity responding to the Kissinger/Nixon initiative. The existing EC competencies had to be respected and defence more appropriately fitted within NATO. France advocated for a separate European defence identity under the umbrella of the WEU. Neither Ireland nor Denmark were WEU members. Other EC members feared France’s WEU designs would weaken NATO.

Notwithstanding this, the Nine, including Ireland, evinced the fortitude to formulate a common EC position and EC identity, fearing US divide-and-rule tactics. Dublin generally interpreted the US approach to negotiations as ‘aggressive’ and unwelcome in early and mid-1973. DFA documents show that Irish officials and the Minister were baffled about what could be helpful in a general EC/European-US declaration as EPC was at an early stage, and there was limited consensus on many issues. Specifics on trade and economics were prejudicial to ongoing EC-US trade negotiations and the imminent Nixon GATT.

In July, the Nine Foreign Ministers asked the Political Committee to produce an identity document for September. The document was to include a political evaluation of the Atlantic relationship and the EC’s position in the world. A French draft in September became the basis for the CDEI after discussions and amendments in the EPC for October and November. In the Irish reports, elements of the CDEI were drawn heavily from Nine’s statement after the Paris Summit on 21 October 1972. Ireland advocated a solid statement of European values and supported a positive, outward-looking text. Its position was that the Nine’s identity statement could not define the identity of all of Europe.

As a neutral, Ireland strove to exclude defence/security, but succumbed in the interests of a united front realising that paragraph 8 was a statement of fact and did not commit Ireland. The Irish boilerplate position was that the document was open to future developments. That reflected the dynamic nature of European integration. However, it held to the position that the declaration should not exceed existing EC competencies and agreed objectives, such as the Paris Declaration of October 1972. If Ireland agreed to approve statements on NATO, it would raise the sensitive question of why it was not a member of NATO. Military neutrality and national sovereignty were sacred cows domestically.

At the suggestion of the Italians, the document was presented to the Heads of Government meeting in Copenhagen for approval following its finalisation. The Irish Foreign Minister and the Department of Foreign Affairs disapproved of Pompidou’s ‘fireside chat’ on several grounds, so it is ironic that it approved the first EC identity statement.

Period	31 May 2024
Event title	The Copenhagen Declaration of 14 December 1973 : A forgotten document, missed opportunity and neglected legacy?
Event type	Conference
Location	Hamburg, Germany, HamburgShow on map
Degree of Recognition	International