A foundation for Pareto optimality

Conal Duddy; Ashley Piggins

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.005

A foundation for Pareto optimality

Conal Duddy
, Ashley Piggins

Cork University Business School

University of Galway

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Can an axiomatic justification be given for the requirement that society picks all and only Pareto optimal alternatives at each profile of individual preferences? Using the framework of fixed-agenda social choice theory, we present a characterization of the Pareto optimal social choice correspondence. We introduce a new independence condition, P-independence. When combined with three natural assumptions, P-independence leads to the conclusion that the social choice set and the Pareto optimal set are the same.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	25-30
Number of pages	6
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	88
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.005
Publication status	Published - May 2020

Keywords

Fixed agenda
Oligarchy
P-independence
P-oligarchy
Pareto optimal social choice correspondence

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10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.005

https://hdl.handle.net/10468/9792Licence: CC BY-NC-ND

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KW - P-oligarchy

KW - Pareto optimal social choice correspondence

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A foundation for Pareto optimality

Abstract

Keywords

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