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Analyzing the Vulnerability of Wireless Sensor Networks to a Malicious Matched Protocol Attack

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Abstract

Safety critical, Internet of Things (IoT) and space-based applications have recently begun to adopt wireless networks based on commercial off the shelf (COTS) devices and standardized protocols, which inherently establishes the security challenge of malicious intrusions. Malicious intrusions can cause severe consequences if undetected, including, complete denial of services. Particularly, any safety critical application requires all services to operate correctly, as any loss can be detrimental to safety and/or privacy. Therefore, in order for these safety critical services to remain operational and available, any and all intrusions need to be detected and mitigated. Whilst intrusion detection is not a new research area, new vulnerabilities in wireless networks, especially wireless sensor networks (WSNs), can be identified. In this paper, a specific vulnerability of WSNs is explored, termed here the matched protocol attack. This malicious attack uses protocol-specific structures to compromise a network using that protocol. Through attack exploration, this paper provides evidence that traditional spectral techniques are not sufficient to detect an intrusion using this style of attack. Furthermore, a ZigBee cluster head network, which co-exists with ISM band services, consisting of XBee COTS devices is utilized, along with a real time spectrum analyzer, to experimentally evaluate the effect of matched protocol interference on a realistic network model. Results of this evaluation are provided in terms of device errors and spectrum use. This malicious challenge is also examined through Monte-Carlo simulations. A potential detection technique, based on coarse inter-node distance measurements, which can theoretically be used to detect matched protocol interference and localize the origin of the source, is also suggested as a future progression of this work. Insights into how this attack style preys on some of the main security risks of any WSN (interoperability, device limitations and operation in hostile environments) are also provided.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication52nd Annual 2018 IEEE International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, ICCST 2018 - Proceedings
EditorsBrian G. Rich
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781538679319
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 21 Dec 2018
Event52nd Annual IEEE International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, ICCST 2018 - Montreal, Canada
Duration: 22 Oct 201825 Oct 2018

Publication series

NameProceedings - International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology
Volume2018-October
ISSN (Print)1071-6572

Conference

Conference52nd Annual IEEE International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, ICCST 2018
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityMontreal
Period22/10/1825/10/18

Keywords

  • Attack
  • Co-existence
  • Detection
  • Distance
  • Inter-Node
  • Interference
  • Intrusion
  • IoT
  • Matched
  • Mitigation
  • PHY
  • Protocol
  • Security
  • Space
  • Spectrum
  • WSN and ZigBee

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