Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: An impossibility result

Conal Duddy

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.009

Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: An impossibility result

Conal Duddy

University of Galway

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We consider methods of electing a fixed number of candidates, greater than one, by approval ballot. We define a representativeness property and a Pareto property and show that these jointly imply manipulability.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	14-16
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	124
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.009
Publication status	Published - Jul 2014
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Approval Voting
Committee
Manipulability

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10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.009

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title = "Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: An impossibility result",

abstract = "We consider methods of electing a fixed number of candidates, greater than one, by approval ballot. We define a representativeness property and a Pareto property and show that these jointly imply manipulability.",

keywords = "Approval Voting, Committee, Manipulability",

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year = "2014",

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journal = "Economics Letters",

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KW - Manipulability

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.009

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 1

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Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: An impossibility result

Abstract

Keywords

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