Else Voigtländer on Social Self-feelings

This article reconstructs and systematically assesses Else’s Voigtländer’s theory of self-feelings. In the first section, I introduce the reader to the basic ideas of this theory by supporting the exegetical claim that the notion of self-feeling encompasses two distinct kinds of experiences: (i) a subject’s long-standing and enduring self-feeling, which is innate and biologically grounded, should be distinguished from (ii) the plurality of episodic self-feelings (or self-conscious emotions) this subject can experience. In the second section, I focus on the particular class of self-feelings that Voigtländer labels as “inauthentic:” these are feelings where the evaluation of the self depends on the evaluations that others have about the self. After elaborating on the morally and epistemically negative connotation Voitgländer attaches to the notion of a feeling’s “inauthenticity,” I reject the generality of her claim in the third section: some social self-feelings are not inauthentic.