@inbook{588033ff12b14fd5a1281b0f15547ba4,
title = "Existence and computation of equilibria of first-price auctions with integral valuations and bids",
abstract = "We consider existence and computation of symmetric Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) in single-item, sealed- bid, first-price auctions with integral valuations and bids. For the most general case, we show that existence of PSNE is NP-hard. Then, we present algorithmic results for the case of independent valuations and two ways of breaking ties: Vickrey tie-breaking and random tie-breaking.",
keywords = "Aamas proceedings, Economics, Interactions::auctions and related structures, Theoretical",
author = "Guillaume Escamocher and Miltersen, \{Peter Bro\} and \{Rocio Santillan\}, R.",
year = "2009",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781615673346",
series = "Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS",
publisher = "International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)",
pages = "1080--1081",
booktitle = "8th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2009, AAMAS 2009",
address = "United States",
note = "8th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2009, AAMAS 2009 ; Conference date: 10-05-2009 Through 15-05-2009",
}