Abstract
Since the early 2000s, Sino-foreign equity joint ventures (JVs) have declined sharply as a predominant strategy for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to enter and operate in China. We study one of the contributory factors, foreign buyout, and its performance implications. By applying incomplete contract theory and an agency perspective, we provide micro evidence that superior post buyout performance is observed in converted wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOSs) with efficiency-seeking operations and subsequent CEO succession. The findings extend our understanding that ownership per se does not guarantee performance improvement. Instead, it is the alignment between ownership and the owner's inputs, and between ownership and the owner's managerial control, that give rise to performance improvement.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 101243 |
| Journal | Journal of World Business |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Aug 2021 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goals
Keywords
- Agency theory
- CEO succession
- China
- Efficiency-seeking FDI
- Firm performance
- Foreign buyout
- Incomplete contract theory
- International equity joint venture
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