FPGA implementations of the round two SHA-3 candidates

  • Brian Baldwin
  • , Andrew Byrnet
  • , Liang Lu
  • , Mark Hamilton
  • , Neil Hanley
  • , Maire O'Neill
  • , William P. Marnane

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingsConference proceedingpeer-review

Abstract

The second round of the NIST-run public competition is underway to find a new hash algorithm(s) for inclusion in the NIST Secure Hash Standard (SHA-3). This paper presents the full implementations of all of the second round candidates in hardware with all of their variants. In order to determine their computational efficiency, an important aspect in NIST's round two evaluation criteria, this paper gives an area/speed comparison of each design both with and without a hardware interface, thereby giving an overall impression of their performance in resource constrained and resource abundant environments. The implementation results are provided for a Virtex-5 FPGA device. The efficiency of the architectures for the hash functions are compared in terms of throughput per unit area. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first work to date to present hardware designs which test for all message digest sizes (224, 256, 384, 512), and also the only work to include the padding as part of the hardware for the SHA-3 hash functions.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2010 International Conference on Field Programmable Logic and Applications, FPL 2010
Pages400-407
Number of pages8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010
Event20th International Conference on Field Programmable Logic and Applications, FPL 2010 - Milano, Italy
Duration: 31 Aug 20102 Sep 2010

Publication series

NameProceedings - 2010 International Conference on Field Programmable Logic and Applications, FPL 2010

Conference

Conference20th International Conference on Field Programmable Logic and Applications, FPL 2010
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityMilano
Period31/08/102/09/10

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