TY - JOUR
T1 - Isolated WDDL
T2 - A hiding countermeasure for differential power analysis on FPGAs
AU - McEvoy, Robert P.
AU - Murphy, Colin C.
AU - Marnane, William P.
AU - Tunstall, Michael
PY - 2009/3
Y1 - 2009/3
N2 - Security protocols are frequently accelerated by implementing the underlying cryptographic functions in reconfigurable hardware. However, unprotected hardware implementations are susceptible to side-channel attacks, and Differential Power Analysis (DPA) has been shown to be especially powerful. In this work, we evaluate and compare the effectiveness of common hiding countermeasures against DPA in FPGA-based designs, using the Whirlpool hash function as a case study. In particular, we develop a new design flow called Isolated WDDL (IWDDL). In contrast with previous works, IWDDL isolates the direct and complementary circuit paths, and also provides DPA resistance in the Hamming distance power model. The analysis is supported using actual implementation results. Security protocols are frequently accelerated by implementing the underlying cryptographic functions in reconfigurable hardware. However, unprotected hardware implementations are susceptible to side-channel attacks, and Differential Power Analysis (DPA) has been shown to be especially powerful. In this work, we evaluate and compare the effectiveness of common hiding countermeasures against DPA in FPGA-based designs, using the Whirlpool hash function as a case study. In particular, we develop a new design flow called Isolated WDDL (IWDDL). In contrast with previous works, IWDDL isolates the direct and complementary circuit paths, and also provides DPA resistance in the Hamming distance power model. The analysis is supported using actual implementation results.
AB - Security protocols are frequently accelerated by implementing the underlying cryptographic functions in reconfigurable hardware. However, unprotected hardware implementations are susceptible to side-channel attacks, and Differential Power Analysis (DPA) has been shown to be especially powerful. In this work, we evaluate and compare the effectiveness of common hiding countermeasures against DPA in FPGA-based designs, using the Whirlpool hash function as a case study. In particular, we develop a new design flow called Isolated WDDL (IWDDL). In contrast with previous works, IWDDL isolates the direct and complementary circuit paths, and also provides DPA resistance in the Hamming distance power model. The analysis is supported using actual implementation results. Security protocols are frequently accelerated by implementing the underlying cryptographic functions in reconfigurable hardware. However, unprotected hardware implementations are susceptible to side-channel attacks, and Differential Power Analysis (DPA) has been shown to be especially powerful. In this work, we evaluate and compare the effectiveness of common hiding countermeasures against DPA in FPGA-based designs, using the Whirlpool hash function as a case study. In particular, we develop a new design flow called Isolated WDDL (IWDDL). In contrast with previous works, IWDDL isolates the direct and complementary circuit paths, and also provides DPA resistance in the Hamming distance power model. The analysis is supported using actual implementation results.
KW - DPA
KW - FPGA
KW - Secure logic
KW - Side-channel attacks
KW - Whirlpool
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84864132329
U2 - 10.1145/1502781.1502784
DO - 10.1145/1502781.1502784
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84864132329
SN - 1936-7406
VL - 2
JO - ACM Transactions on Reconfigurable Technology and Systems
JF - ACM Transactions on Reconfigurable Technology and Systems
IS - 1
M1 - 3
ER -