Job security in an efficiency wage model

William Sjostrom

doi:10.1016/0164-0704(93)90061-P

Job security in an efficiency wage model

William Sjostrom

Cork University Business School

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In a Shapiro-Stiglitz efficiency wage model, restrictions on the ability of employers to fire employees caught shirking are shown to reduce employment and raise involuntary unemployment.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	183-187
Number of pages	5
Journal	Journal of Macroeconomics
Volume	15
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0164-0704(93)90061-P
Publication status	Published - 1993

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title = "Job security in an efficiency wage model",

abstract = "In a Shapiro-Stiglitz efficiency wage model, restrictions on the ability of employers to fire employees caught shirking are shown to reduce employment and raise involuntary unemployment.",

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year = "1993",

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JO - Journal of Macroeconomics

JF - Journal of Macroeconomics

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Job security in an efficiency wage model

Abstract

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