Missing the nuclear boat? British policy and French military nuclear ambitions during the Euratom foundation negotiiations, 1955-56

This article examines the neglected nuclear dimension of European integration during the EURATOM foundation negotiations of 1955-1956. Britain's decision to remain outside EURATOM was shaped by anxieties over French military nuclear ambitions and the defence of the Anglo-American "special relationship," rather than solely by traditional objections to European supranationalism. While France sought British participation to benefit from Britain's nuclear expertise, Britain favoured of a looser, intergovernmental OEEC alternative. The analysis reveals that British concerns about potential French nuclear weapons development, coupled with British dependency on American nuclear technology, fundamentally constrained London. Paradoxically, the American provision of enriched uranium and explicit support for EURATOM overrode British obstructionism and precipitated France's shift toward developing a national nuclear programme. The article concludes that Britain's adherence to Anglo-American nuclear cooperation at the expense of European engagement cost the UK its technological leadership in civil nuclear energy, enabled American commercial dominance of the European nuclear market, and ironically spurred French military nuclear development—outcomes contrary to British objectives