TY - GEN
T1 - Personal Voice Assistant Wake Word Jamming
AU - Sagi, Prathyusha
AU - Sankar, Arun
AU - Roedig, Utz
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 IEEE.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - Personal Voice Assistants (PVAs) such as Apple's Siri, Amazon's Alexa and Google Home are now ubiquitous. These devices continuously listen for a wake word that users speak to start interaction with the device. If this wake word recognition is disrupted, the device is not usable anymore. The wake word detection can be impeded by acoustic interference. Interference might be noise (e.g. background music, chatter, engine sounds) or a deliberate acoustic jamming signal. While wake word recognition algorithms might be designed with resilience against noise in mind they are usually not prepared to handle an attacker using a jamming signal. This work provides the first detailed study of acoustic Denial of Service (DoS) jamming attacks on the PVA wake word detection. We describe how a jamming signal should be designed such that wake word detection is jeopardised effectively while minimising jamming effort and jamming detectability. We study the impact of various noise features such as signal type, strength, timing, duration, frequency and bandwidth. Our work shows that accurately timed signals with a very short duration of only 2ms can prevent PVA operations reliably.
AB - Personal Voice Assistants (PVAs) such as Apple's Siri, Amazon's Alexa and Google Home are now ubiquitous. These devices continuously listen for a wake word that users speak to start interaction with the device. If this wake word recognition is disrupted, the device is not usable anymore. The wake word detection can be impeded by acoustic interference. Interference might be noise (e.g. background music, chatter, engine sounds) or a deliberate acoustic jamming signal. While wake word recognition algorithms might be designed with resilience against noise in mind they are usually not prepared to handle an attacker using a jamming signal. This work provides the first detailed study of acoustic Denial of Service (DoS) jamming attacks on the PVA wake word detection. We describe how a jamming signal should be designed such that wake word detection is jeopardised effectively while minimising jamming effort and jamming detectability. We study the impact of various noise features such as signal type, strength, timing, duration, frequency and bandwidth. Our work shows that accurately timed signals with a very short duration of only 2ms can prevent PVA operations reliably.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85192439405
U2 - 10.1109/PerComWorkshops59983.2024.10503529
DO - 10.1109/PerComWorkshops59983.2024.10503529
M3 - Conference proceeding
AN - SCOPUS:85192439405
T3 - 2024 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops and other Affiliated Events, PerCom Workshops 2024
SP - 19
EP - 24
BT - 2024 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops and other Affiliated Events, PerCom Workshops 2024
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2024 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops and other Affiliated Events, PerCom Workshops 2024
Y2 - 11 March 2024 through 15 March 2024
ER -