Reconciling probability theory and coherentism

Conal Duddy

doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0310-4

Reconciling probability theory and coherentism

Conal Duddy

University of Galway

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Recent results in the literature appear to show that it is impossible for two independent testimonies to jointly raise the probability of a proposition if neither testimony individually has any impact on that probability. I show that these impossibility results do not apply when testimonies agree on incidental details.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1075-1084
Number of pages	10
Journal	Synthese
Volume	191
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0310-4
Publication status	Published - Apr 2014
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Bayesian
Coherence
Coherentism
Probability theory
Testimony
Witness model

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10.1007/s11229-013-0310-4

Cite this

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abstract = "Recent results in the literature appear to show that it is impossible for two independent testimonies to jointly raise the probability of a proposition if neither testimony individually has any impact on that probability. I show that these impossibility results do not apply when testimonies agree on incidental details.",

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KW - Bayesian

KW - Coherence

KW - Coherentism

KW - Probability theory

KW - Testimony

KW - Witness model

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DO - 10.1007/s11229-013-0310-4

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Reconciling probability theory and coherentism

Abstract

Keywords

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